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INCOME GROWTH AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION: A LONG-RUN VIEW 
OF IRISH EXPERIENCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past 30 years, there have been periods of boom and bust, but average 
household incomes have grown strongly in Ireland. The distribution of household 
income has been broadly stable over this period, so that there has been substantial 
growth for low-, middle- and high-income households. Ireland’s rapid, even growth 
in incomes across the distribution is unusual in an international setting. During this 
time, inequality has risen in many other countries. As a result, while Ireland was 
once towards the high end of the inequality spectrum for an advanced country, it 
now occupies a middle-ranking position. Market income inequality is high in 
Ireland, but a redistributive tax and transfer system has helped to offset that. Over 
the 1987 to 2014 period, discretionary changes in tax and welfare policy led to gains 
which were greatest among those with incomes in the lowest 20 per cent of 
households. Much of this differential growth in incomes arose from the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on Social Welfare 
(1986), which raised the payment rates for the schemes with the lowest payment 
levels. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Data gathered by the CSO’s Survey on Income and Living Conditions have featured 
regularly in debate about policy on social inclusion and public policy. Analysis of the 
distributional impact of budgetary policy, based on the same underlying data, has 
also become an ongoing part of debate about tax and welfare policy. SILC began in 
2003, but similar survey evidence is available for some earlier years, going back at 
least as far as 1987. In this paper we use both the SILC data and the earlier data to 
provide some longer-term perspectives on how household income levels, and the 
distribution of household incomes, have evolved in Ireland. We concentrate for the 
most part on the period 1987 to 2014, for which we have the greatest detail in 
terms of household surveys.1 This longer-run perspective provides insights that are 
valuable in themselves, and provide a useful backdrop in interpreting the shorter-
run movements in incomes and income distribution which have tended to receive 
greater attention. We document the movements in incomes and in income 
distribution over the period. 
This investigation has parallels in the international literature, where one of the key 
themes has been the examination of the combined impact of overall growth and 
income inequality on the living standards of ordinary families (see Nolan, 2018 and 
 
                                                          
 
1 This paper draws on material first presented by Callan et al. (2016). 
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Cribb et al., 2017). We draw therefore on some results from this literature and find 
interesting comparisons and contrasts with developments elsewhere, notably in 
the UK. 
Tax and welfare policies play a key role in generating the observed outcomes. We 
analyse the impact of discretionary policy changes over the 27-year period, using 
SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model. Our analysis uses a ‘wage indexed’ budget as 
a distributionally neutral benchmark against which to assess the distributional 
impact of tax and welfare policy. The conventions governing the construction of the 
‘opening budget’ involve a nominal freeze on the money value of tax and welfare 
parameters. We also examine the long-run implications of maintaining such a 
freeze on tax and welfare policy parameters. 
We begin by reviewing the evidence on the growth of incomes over the 1987 to 
2014 period. Section 2 draws both on national accounts sources and, where 
available, on household income surveys. Overall income growth is strong, but there 
were sustained periods where incomes were stable or falling, counterbalanced by 
very rapid growth at other times. Section 3 finds that the overall distribution of 
income was remarkably stable, as measured by the Gini coefficient or by quintile 
shares, over a period of almost 30 years. The net result was strong and relatively 
even growth in incomes across the income distribution. Section 4 shows that 
Ireland’s experience means that it now occupies a middle-ranking position in terms 
of income inequality across countries. 
Ireland’s rapid, even growth in incomes across the distribution is unusual in an 
international setting. The role of tax and transfer policy in generating the observed 
outcomes is examined in Section 5. While market income inequality in Ireland is 
towards the high end of the international spectrum, the redistributive impact of 
Ireland’s tax and transfer system helps to ensure that inequality in disposable 
income is at a middle-ranking level. 
Over the 1987 to 2014 period, discretionary changes in tax and welfare policy led 
to gains which were greatest among those with incomes in the lowest 20 per cent 
of households. Much of this differential growth in incomes arose from the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on Social Welfare 
(1986), which raised the payment rates for the schemes with the lowest payment 
levels. 
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2. INCOME GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM SURVEYS AND FROM 
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 
Analysis of the distribution of household income requires the use of household 
survey data.2 Comparisons with national accounts data can, however, be helpful in 
establishing whether surveys are adequately representing the overall growth in 
incomes. Nolan et al. (2018) identify a range of reasons for divergences between 
median equivalised household incomes and GDP per capita. They find that there is 
substantial variation over time and across countries in the divergences between the 
two approaches. For Ireland, their analysis indicates that the main sources of 
divergence over the 1987 to 2010 period relate to the difference between GDP and 
Gross National Income, and the household size adjustment (per capita for national 
accounts versus adjustment in line with the number of adult equivalents for survey 
data). While the Nolan et al. analysis allows for a potential gap between the 
incomes covered by Gross National Income and survey data, this gap turns out to 
be very small (averaging one twentieth of 1 per cent per annum). 
Figure 1 plots GNP per capita, and household incomes from survey sources. It 
should be noted that for the SILC years (2003–2014), we follow the OECD approach 
of using a lag of one year, partly reflecting the fact that SILC incomes are measured 
with respect to the 12 months prior to interview.  
 
                                                          
 
2  Administrative data have advantages in the analysis of the very highest incomes. However, administrative data on 
incomes refer to the relevant tax unit (with couples mainly, but not universally, treated as a single unit). This means 
that they cannot provide a picture of the broader household income distribution, which is the key unit for income 
distribution analysis internationally. 
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FIGURE 1 GNP AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME GROWTH, 1973–2014 
 
 
Sources:  CSO National Income Accounts 2015; Household surveys: CSO Household Budget Survey (1973, 1980); ESRI Survey of 
Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, 1987; ESRI Living in Ireland Survey 1994–2001; CSO Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions, 2003–2014. 
Notes:  Incomes in SILC refer to a 12-month period prior to interview. Given that fieldwork is spread evenly through the year, the 
average lag in incomes is approximately six months. Divergences between household income and GNP are to be expected 
on several grounds, including policy ‘smoothing’ of income changes, and policy lags in the adjustment to recession over this 
period – hence the use of a 12-month lag in the graph.3 
 
Our focus on GNP, which is much closer than GDP to Gross National Income, 
removes one of the main sources of divergence. Nolan et al.’s analysis indicates 
that most of the divergence that remains relates to the household size adjustment, 
and to the difference between the GDP deflator and the Consumer Price Index. This 
lends confidence to the current analysis of income growth and income inequality 
using household surveys as being broadly consistent with the picture painted by 
national accounts, before the emergence of recent difficulties with such measures 
(and the introduction of new concepts, such as modified GNI (GNI*), to deal with 
them). 
As noted in Callan et al. (2017), household incomes did not fall as fast as the initial 
GNP shock in 2009, but continued to fall while GNP rose in 2010, so that over the 
 
                                                          
 
3  The period covered here pre-dates the 26 per cent recorded growth rate in 2015. The smaller year-to-year impacts of 
earlier multinational activities (such as redomiciled plcs), identified by FitzGerald (2015), do not affect the broad point 
made in relation to Figure 1. 
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two-year period both income measures fell by similar proportions. The gap 
between GNP and household income changes in these years could be interpreted 
as reflecting some smoothing of the shock to household incomes by tax and welfare 
policy.  
Both series show very substantial growth – more than doubling – in real incomes 
between 1987 and 2014. Growth is not steady over the period – there are long 
periods of income stagnation, alternating with very rapid growth.4 Nolan et al. 
detail a number of reasons why household survey incomes differ from GNP per 
capita. In the recessionary period, it should also be noted that deficit budgeting by 
the Irish government helped to ensure that household incomes did not fall as fast 
as the initial fall in GNP. 
 
FIGURE 2  UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (OECD HARMONISED), 1983–2018 
 
 
Source: OECD. 
 
In interpreting later results it is also important to recognise the role played by 
dramatic movements in the unemployment rate. There was very limited income 
growth between 1973 and 1987, during which time the unemployment rate was 
above 13 per cent. Fast growth in incomes between 1994 and 2007 was 
accompanied by a fall in unemployment to historically low levels. More recently 
unemployment spiked again during the Great Recession, but it is now reaching 
much lower levels as the economy recovers. 
 
                                                          
 
4  See Honohan and Walsh (2002) for an overview of factors contributing to rapid growth after earlier stagnation. 
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3.  INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1987–2014 
Has the extent of inequality in household incomes increased over the recession? In 
order to examine this question, we focus on the repeated cross-sections (or 
‘snapshots’) of the household income distribution provided by the Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions. We consider both the Gini coefficient, the most 
commonly used summary measure of income inequality, and measures which 
provide a more detailed perspective of income share and income levels at the 
bottom, middle and top of the income distribution. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the Gini coefficient for household disposable 
income for Ireland from 1987 to 2014. What is evident from this figure is the broad 
stability of the Gini coefficient over the whole period, despite the major upheavals 
in the later years of a boom, bubble and bust in the economy, with unemployment 
rising from 5 to 15 per cent and a collapse in the banking system. A small increase 
in the Gini coefficient is evident between 2008 and 2013, where the point estimate 
rises from 30.6 to 32.0. By 2015, the Gini had fallen back to 30.8. Savage et al. (2017) 
find that there is very limited evidence of any statistically significant differences 
between the estimates for individual years. In fact, the hypothesis that inequality 
is the same, at its average level, over the whole period cannot be rejected 
statistically.5 Very similar findings are obtained by Savage et al. (2017) when looking 
at incomes net of housing costs. 
 
 
                                                          
 
5  An exception to this is in 2009, when the Gini reached a historic low of 29.3. See Callan et al. (2014) for further 
discussion. 
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FIGURE 3 GINI COEFFICIENT FOR HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE INCOME PER ADULT EQUIVALENT, 
1987, 1994–2001 AND 2003–2014 
 
 
Source: 1987: ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services. 1994–2001: Living in Ireland Survey. 
2004–2015: CSO Survey on Income and Living Conditions. 
 
Table 1 shows that there has been remarkably little movement in quintile shares 
measured at approximately seven-year intervals, despite the very different 
macroeconomic contexts involved. 
 
TABLE 1 QUINTILE SHARES OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME, IRELAND, SELECTED YEARS 1987–2014 
Decile 1987 1994 2000 2007 2014 
Lowest 8 8 8 8 8 
2nd 13 12 13 12 13 
3rd 17 17 18 17 17 
4th 23 23 23 23 23 
Highest 40 40 38 40 40 
 
Source: 1987: ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services. 1994, 2000: Living in Ireland Survey. 
2007, 2014: CSO Survey on Income and Living Conditions. 
 
What does the growth in incomes observed in Figure 1, and the stability in 
inequality measures, imply for income growth at different points in the household 
income distribution? This has been a major concern in some countries, with a 
‘becalming’ affecting middle incomes (Section 4 will examine this further). In 
Ireland, however, substantial overall growth and stability in inequality have 
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translated into substantial growth at all levels of the income distribution. Figure 4 
illustrates this, showing growth of over 100 per cent for deciles 2 to 9, and of close 
to 95 per cent for the bottom decile. 
 
FIGURE 4 GROWTH IN HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY DECILE OF EQUIVALISED INCOME: IRELAND, 
1987–2014 
 
 
4.  INCOME GROWTH AND ITS DISTRIBUTION: IRELAND IN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
International concern about rising inequality can be readily traced in a series of 
reports from the OECD. For example, OECD (2015) notes that OECD (2011) 
documented ‘the deep-rooted reasons why inequality was rising so much’ and 
states that ‘Over the past three decades, income inequality has risen in most OECD 
countries’. Given this trend towards rising inequality internationally, the stability of 
income inequality in Ireland means that it is now among the countries in the middle 
of the inequality rankings, as illustrated in Table 2. Among OECD countries for which 
a Gini coefficient is available in the OECD Income Distribution Database, there are 
15 countries with lower Gini coefficients than Ireland and 17 countries with higher 
coefficients. Countries with a Gini coefficient within 1 percentage point of Ireland’s 
include Germany, France and the Netherlands. 
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TABLE 2 DISPOSABLE INCOME GINI COEFFICIENTS IN OECD COUNTRIES (2014) 
Country Gini coefficient 
Iceland 0.246 
Slovak Republic 0.247 
Slovenia 0.251 
Denmark 0.256 
Czech Republic 0.257 
Finland 0.257 
Norway 0.257 
Belgium 0.266 
Austria 0.274 
Sweden 0.274 
Luxembourg 0.284 
Hungary 0.288 
Germany 0.289 
France 0.293 
Switzerland 0.297 
IRELAND 0.298 
Poland 0.298 
Korea 0.302 
Netherlands 0.305 
Canada 0.313 
Italy 0.326 
Australia 0.337 
Portugal 0.338 
Greece 0.339 
Spain 0.344 
Estonia 0.346 
New Zealand 0.349 
Latvia 0.35 
United Kingdom 0.356 
Israel 0.365 
United States 0.394 
Turkey 0.398 
Mexico 0.459 
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database, accessed on 23 May 2018. 
 
The impact of rising inequality has also been noted in OECD (2015): ‘In recent 
decades, as much as 40% of the population at the lower end of the distribution has 
benefited little from economic growth in many countries’. This focus on the living 
standards of ordinary workers is a theme in a new study on generating prosperity 
for working families in affluent countries (Nolan, 2018). We draw here on some 
aspects of this study, which help to contextualise our findings regarding the growth 
in Irish incomes across the distribution. Nolan and Thewissen (2018) report annual 
average income growth over a period from about 1980 for a range of countries, 
10 
 
including Ireland. We focus first, in Table 3, on how Ireland compares with results 
for the US and the UK. The US results show little gain at the median level of income, 
and negligible gains or losses at lower income percentiles. For the UK, there are 
significant gains at the median, but these are less than at higher levels; and gains 
for the bottom half of the distribution are lower than the median gain. For Ireland, 
by contrast, there are substantial gains at all income levels – and rather similar 
levels of gain across the distribution. 
Nolan and Thewissen’s analysis also shows that the level of growth of household 
income in Ireland is exceptional in the broader international context, ranking 
second in terms of income growth among the 31 countries included. The level of 
3.23% for growth in median income compares with an average across the 31 
countries of 1.2%. Most countries have income growth that is either low or skewed 
towards the top. Ireland is unusual in having a combination of fast growth and 
relatively even distribution of that growth. 
 
TABLE 3  ANNUAL AVERAGE INCOME GROWTH AT SELECTED PERCENTILES, LONGEST 
PERIOD COVERED SINCE 1980: US, UK, IRELAND 
Percentile P10 P30 Median (P50) P70 P90 
USA −0.08 0.01 0.27 0.50 0.82 
UK 1.22 1.27 1.49 1.72 2.05 
Ireland 3.34 3.33 3.23 3.04 2.82 
 
Source: Nolan and Thewissen (2018), Table 2.7. 
5.  INCOME DISTRIBUTION OUTCOMES IN THE LONG RUN: WHAT 
ROLE HAS TAX-TRANSFER POLICY PLAYED? 
Disposable incomes can be seen as having two major components: market incomes, 
and the net balance between income taxes and income transfers. Market incomes 
include earnings from employment and self-employment, rents and investment 
income. Income-related taxes include income tax and social security contributions.6 
Transfers include State pensions (both contributory and non-contributory) and a 
wide range of working-age payments associated with different contingencies (e.g. 
unemployment, illness, lone parenthood). 
We provide two perspectives on the role of tax and transfers in the long-run 
evolution of incomes and income distribution. In Section 5.1, we continue with the 
international comparative theme, highlighting differences in the role played by the 
Irish tax-transfer system as against those in the UK and the US. Section 5.2 examines 
the impact of actual policy choices in Ireland relative to a neutral, wage-indexed 
 
                                                          
 
6  In the Irish context, USC (Universal Social Charge) is a form of income tax, as no entitlement is associated 
with the payment of USC. 
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budget, and of some alternative choices including long-run indexation with respect 
to prices or a freeze on tax and welfare parameters in nominal terms. Section 5.3 
reconsiders issues relating to the choice of a neutral benchmark for policy 
evaluation. 
5.1 Market income and redistribution: US, UK and Ireland 
Figure 5 shows how inequality in market incomes, as measured using the Gini 
coefficient, has evolved over the 2004 to 2015 period. All three countries are at the 
high end of the international spectrum in this regard. Up to 2007, the Gini 
coefficients for market income in Ireland and in the UK were almost identical. With 
the differential impact of the crisis, market income inequality rose sharply in Ireland 
but was relatively stable in the UK. With falling unemployment as the Irish economy 
has recovered, market income inequality fell sharply in 2014. Data for 2015, based 
on SILC 2016, are due to be published by OECD in summer 2018. It will be of interest 
to see whether the continuing fall in unemployment brings Irish market income 
inequality closer to the stable UK figure. 
Figure 5 also shows the evolution of disposable income inequality, again as 
measured by the Gini coefficient. Despite higher market income inequality in 
Ireland, the Gini coefficient for disposable income lies below those for the US and 
the UK. 
 
FIGURE 5 GINI COEFFICIENTS FOR MARKET AND DISPOSABLE INCOME: IRELAND, UK AND US 
 
Source:       OECD Income Distribution Database. 
Note: The OECD practice, based on the fact that for almost all SILC countries income data refer to the previous calendar 
year, is to record data for SILC year t as data for year t − 1. For Ireland, the average lag is closer to 6 months, as data 
refer to the 12 months prior to interview. 
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Figure 6 clarifies the role played by tax-transfer policy in the three countries, 
identifying the extent of redistribution as measured by the difference (reduction) 
between the Gini coefficients for market income and disposable income. This is 
known as the Reynolds–Smolensky index of redistribution (Reynolds and 
Smolensky, 1977). The level of redistribution is higher in Ireland initially. 
With the advent of the Great Recession, the redistribution index rises sharply in 
Ireland, with only moderate increases in the UK and even milder effects in the US. 
Previous analysis (Savage et al., 2018) has indicated that the rise in redistributive 
impact in Ireland is mainly due to automatic stabilisation effects – such as increased 
unemployment compensation when unemployment increases – rather than 
discretionary policy changes. Callan et al. (2018) also identify significant automatic 
stabilisation impacts in a number of EU crisis countries. 
 
FIGURE 6 REDISTRIBUTION INDICES (REYNOLDS–SMOLENSKY): US, UK AND IRELAND, 2004-2014  
 
Source:       OECD Income Distribution Database. 
Note: The Reynolds–Smolensky index measures the reduction in the Gini coefficient when moving from market income 
(before taxes and transfers) to disposable income (after taxes and transfers). 
 
5.2 Long-run perspectives on the impact of changes in tax-transfer 
policy 
Administrative and political approaches to the construction of an ‘opening budget’ 
differ across countries, across tax and welfare parameters, and over time. In 
Ireland, the general convention for annual budgets is that tax and welfare 
parameters are frozen in nominal terms. On the other hand, long-run pension 
policy, as reaffirmed in the recent Roadmap for Pensions Reform (Government of 
Ireland, 2018), establishes a target of 34% of average earnings for the State 
Contributory Pension. This implies that annual adjustments would be in line with 
wage growth. 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
US
UK
IRE
13 
 
In the UK, since the Rooker–Wise amendment of 1977, increases in tax-free 
allowances and tax bands have been linked to the rate of price inflation. State 
pensions in the UK, from 2010, have been adjusted using a more complex formula 
known as the triple lock: the higher of price inflation and wage inflation, but also 
subject to a minimum increase of 2.5 per cent. If policy impacts are measured 
against such politically determined ‘default options’, then they can be influenced 
by government choices as to the default option. For independent policy evaluation, 
what is needed is an appropriate benchmark. The case for using a ‘distributionally 
neutral’ benchmark has been made in a series of Budget Perspectives papers, and 
regularly used in analyses of the impact of annual Budgets. This can be 
implemented using wage growth as the key parameter for uprating of tax and 
welfare policy parameters. Key features of this approach include the following. 
• Average tax rates remain unchanged in the face of wage growth over time. 
• Welfare incomes rise in line with other incomes. 
• The overall distribution of income therefore remains broadly unchanged. 
There may, of course, be reasons why policymakers wish to alter the distribution of 
income – making it more or less equal, or favouring/disfavouring particular groups 
because of issues relating to financial incentives to work. The analytic framework 
of ‘distributionally neutral’ can be seen as a starting point – debate as to changes 
in the distribution can be conducted from this basis. But the independent starting 
point of an unchanged distribution allows for a systematic evaluation of such 
arguments.  
Here we apply this framework to policy changes over the 1987 to 2014 period. We 
begin by examining the evolution of some key tax and welfare parameters. Note 
firstly that real wages rose by just over 70 per cent between 1987 and 2014. The 
State Contributory Pension rose at a similar rate, but other welfare benefits – non-
contributory pensions and jobseeker payments – rose by rather more. This was 
largely due to the fact that in 1987, welfare payment rates were quite dispersed. 
Following the recommendations of the Commission on Social Welfare, the lowest 
payment rates in the system were increased as a new floor to working age 
payments was established, and State non-contributory pensions were raised much 
closer to the contributory pension rate. Most of this adjustment took place in the 
period 1987–1994. 
On the tax side, it should be noted that the standard rate of tax fell from 35 per 
cent to 20 per cent, and that almost all the main tax thresholds – entry to the 
standard rate of tax and to the top rate of tax – more than kept pace with real wage 
growth. The exception to this is the threshold in relation to married couples with 
one earner. The debate around this issue, now generally known as tax 
individualisation, is considered in Callan and Farrell (1991), Callan et al. (2008) and 
Doorley (2018). 
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TABLE 4 REAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN WELFARE AND TAX PARAMETERS, 1987–2014 
Policy parameter Real % increase 
Real wages 71 
Welfare  
State Contributory Pension 75 
State Non-Contributory Pension 95 
Jobseeker’s Benefit 86 
Jobseeker’s Allowance 108 
Tax free allowances (TFA)/Tax credit equivalent  
Personal TFA/credit 73 
Personal & PAYE TFA/credit 156 
Thresholds for top rate of tax  
Single 86 
Married, one earner 45 
Married, two earners 127 
Note: The standard rate of tax fell from 35% to 20%. 
The net impact of these changes can most easily be gauged by examining a contrast 
between the 1987 policy, indexed in line with nominal wage growth, and the actual 
2014 policy. We use the SWITCH model to conduct this comparison, applying it to 
the 2014 population and incomes. The results, reported in Figure 7, show that tax 
and welfare policy in 2014 treated all income groups more favourably than the 
wage-indexed 1987 system. The average gain from discretionary tax-benefit policy, 
relative to the wage-indexed benchmark, was close to 10 per cent. The greatest 
gains were for the two lowest income groups, with the lowest income group 
experiencing by far the greatest gain. This result reflects the adjustments to the 
welfare system described earlier, which were in line with the recommendations of 
the Commission on Social Welfare. 
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FIGURE 7 DISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT OF 2014 TAX AND WELFARE POLICY VERSUS 1987 POLICIES 
INDEXED IN LINE WITH WAGE GROWTH  
 
 
 
In Table 5 we examine the impact of 2014 policy, as against wage indexation, on 
some measures of the risk of poverty. The first measure is the head count or ‘at risk 
of poverty’ measure used by the EU: it counts the proportion of persons living in 
households falling below 60 per cent of median income. The 2014 policy leads to a 
reduction in this head count of poverty by 1 percentage point. 
However, the head count does not give a full picture of the impact on poverty: it 
takes no account of the depth of poverty (how far below the poverty line a 
household’s income falls) or of its distribution (it gives equal weight to a poverty 
reduction arising from a person moving from just below the line to just above, or 
from a minimal income to above the poverty line). The poverty gap measure 
proposed by Foster and Shorrocks (1984) takes account of both the extent of 
poverty, as measured by the head count ratio, and the depth of poverty (for each 
poor individual, how far below the poverty line income they fall). On this broader 
measure, the 2014 policy has a greater impact – reducing the poverty gap by over 
20 per cent. 
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TABLE 5 AT RISK OF POVERTY MEASURES UNDER ALTERNATIVE POLICY SCENARIOS 
At risk of poverty 
measure 
1987 policy 
indexed in 
line with 
wage growth 
Actual 
2014 
Policy 
1987 policy 
unindexed 
(frozen in 
nominal terms) 
1987 policy 
indexed in 
line with 
price 
inflation 
Head count (%) 16.5 15.5 32.2 25.7 
Poverty 
gap 
(index: 
1987 = 
100) 
100 75.5 339 189.8 
 
Source: Analysis using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, on the 2014 SILC. 
 
We look finally at two other scenarios. What if policy had simply indexed welfare 
and tax parameters in line with price inflation, or had frozen these parameters in 
nominal terms? We find that a 1987 policy frozen in nominal terms would have 
doubled the head count of poverty, and trebled the poverty gap. A price-indexed 
policy would have seen the head count of poverty rise by about 50%, and the 
poverty gap close to double. 
This contrasts with stated policy in the area of pensions, where there is a target 
which rises in line with gross earnings. The nature of the conventional opening 
budget ‘frozen in nominal terms’ becomes more evident in the long-run setting 
examined here, and has implications for the debate about the choice of an 
appropriate short-run benchmark for evaluation of the distributional impact of 
budgetary policy. Differences between wage-indexed, price-indexed and nominally 
frozen policies can be relatively small on a year-to-year basis, which is the focus of 
the annual budget. But in the longer run, substantial differences do emerge. This 
further strengthens the case for the use of a wage-indexed benchmark in the short-
run evaluation of distributional impacts, so that the framework used in the short 
run is consistent with that required in the longer run. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Ireland’s income distribution has been broadly stable for most of the past 30 years. 
During this time, inequality has risen in many other countries. As a result, while 
Ireland was once towards the high end of the inequality spectrum for an advanced 
country, it is now closer to the middle rank. Market income inequality is high in 
Ireland, but a redistributive tax and transfer system has helped to offset that. 
Two features of the system stand out. First, in a long-run perspective, adjustment 
of tax and welfare parameters has been in line with, or slightly ahead of, growth in 
wages. This has helped to ensure that ‘fiscal drag’ has not reduced the incomes of 
those in employment, and has helped to provide a floor to incomes for those 
dependent on welfare which has at least kept pace with general income growth. 
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Second, in a short-run perspective, this system has helped to provide automatic 
stabilisation not just of incomes, but of inequality. 
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